Subject in arrears

We usually believe we know what we have said and done because we say and do what we want. This belief, which is probably necessary in everyday life, shaped influential conceptions of subjectivity in modernity: since Descartes, the subject has been used to justify our knowledge of the world. In the course of the linguistic turn, however, the 20th century saw the realisation that, in addition to historical and social conditions, language precedes the subject. At best, it can use it according to its own intention. So-called postmodernism doubts this too: We are not as much in control of our speaking as we would like to believe, because we are not entirely aware of its many conditions. Thus, our 'own' mistakes can surprise us, and our speech has unexpected meanings and effects. It may raise the hopes of others or even hurt them without our intending it. Whether in intimate conversations or political conflicts, our statements have meaning beyond our intention and perception. However, this finding has little to do with the 'death of the subject' that has been hotly debated for too long. On the basis of Jacques Derrida, Arno Schubbach rather shows how subjectivity can be grasped anew. In his critique of Husserl, Derrida argues that subjects themselves cannot be unquestionably given the meaning of their own speech, because they are not fully aware of the conditions that precede it. However, unlike structuralists from Saussure to Bourdieu, he does not derive from this the demand to objectify the subjects involved with social practice. Rather, he insists on their irreducible speech and experience: 'subjects in arrears' must dare to speak without being able to completely master or grasp them. They therefore stand in a responsibility that is not based on their knowledge of their actions and their consequences.