Epistemische Ungerechtigkeit

The understanding that knowledge and power influence and permeate each other, and that they can mutually reinforce or block one another, is not a new insight. What is surprising, however, is that philosophy has taken a long time to closely examine the ethical consequences that arise particularly in our epistemic lives from prejudices and stereotypes. In her groundbreaking book, which is now considered a modern classic, Miranda Fricker takes on this task: she uncovers a previously overlooked, yet highly relevant form of injustice for knowledge societies, which poses a significant threat to both the personal development of those affected and our shared practices of knowing.

The term coined by Miranda Fricker that encapsulates what goes wrong in our epistemic lives is "epistemic injustice." This occurs when women or people of color, migrant communities, or entire populations of continents are denied the ability and right to acquire relevant knowledge and reliably communicate their own experiences. Epistemic injustice also happens when certain groups or individuals lack the conceptual resources—such as the terms for sexual abuse or exploitation—to even recognize and categorize their particular experiences of suffering. Miranda Fricker reveals these two forms of epistemic injustice as powerful yet largely silent dimensions of discrimination. She not only examines the nature of each injustice but also clarifies the virtues we must learn to prevent it. This philosophical standard work is now finally available in German from C.H. Beck.