DiKE Kronzeugenregelung und Schadenersatzklagen im Kartellrecht

The leniency program in antitrust law only grants a company cooperating with the authority an exemption from sanctions in fine proceedings. Civil law claims for damages, on the other hand, remain unaffected by the leniency program. One of the greatest risks for a company wishing to make use of the leniency program is therefore that those injured by the cartel will file claims for damages following the investigation of the reported competition infringement. Specifically, the risk is that, on the one hand, the competition violation becomes public as a result of the self-reporting (which might not have been the case without reporting) and, on the other hand, information and evidence that a reporting company must disclose very extensively to the authorities may end up in the hands of potential civil plaintiffs. As a result, the financial consequences of suing for damages may be more significant than what the company could make up by being exempt from fines. This result fundamentally calls into question the attractiveness of leniency programs and significantly impairs their effectiveness. This Zurich dissertation examines the essential elements of the conflict between leniency programs and damages actions in the legal systems of Switzerland, the EU, and the United States. It analyzes the limits and shortcomings of measures aimed at protecting incriminating information and evidence provided by a cooperating company to antitrust authorities from disclosure. Further, it aims to show how the risk of damages claims could be addressed and how cooperating companies could be better protected. Finally, this dissertation aims to provide food for thought for companies that are involved in conduct that is illegal under antitrust law and that have an.