DiKE Kronzeugenregelung und Schadenersatzklagen im Kartellrecht

The leniency program in antitrust law grants a cooperating company immunity from sanctions in fine proceedings. However, civil claims for damages remain unaffected by the leniency program. One of the biggest risks for a company wishing to take advantage of the leniency program is that those harmed by the cartel may subsequently file damage claims following the investigation of the reported antitrust violation. Specifically, there is a danger that, on the one hand, the antitrust violation becomes public as a result of the self-reporting (which may not have happened without the report) and that, on the other hand, information and evidence that a reporting company must disclose extensively to the authorities could fall into the hands of potential civil claimants. The consequence is that the financial repercussions from damage claims may outweigh what the company could gain from the immunity from fines. This outcome fundamentally questions the attractiveness of leniency programs and significantly undermines the effectiveness of whistleblower programs. This Zurich dissertation examines the essential elements of the conflict between leniency programs and damage claims in the legal systems of Switzerland, the EU, and the USA. It analyzes the limitations and inadequacies of measures aimed at protecting incriminating information and evidence provided by a cooperating company to the antitrust authorities from disclosure. Furthermore, it aims to show how the risk of damage claims could be addressed and how willing-to-cooperate companies could be better protected. Finally, this dissertation seeks to provide insights for companies involved in antitrust violations.