DiKE Die unverbindliche Preisempfehlung

Non-binding price recommendations (NPR) are widely used in the economy and can be found in various forms. However, their antitrust assessment raises numerous questions that have not been fully clarified by the current vertical notice from the WEKO or by the practices of competition authorities. Their complexity is reflected, among other things, in the ambivalence of their economic effects. This St. Gallen dissertation offers a comprehensive interdisciplinary treatment of vertical non-binding price recommendations. It summarizes the relevant economic literature and critically discusses it in relation to the antitrust examination of non-binding price recommendations. It clarifies the implications of non-bindingness, compliance, and any pressure or incentives provided, as well as other aspects that need to be considered in the antitrust assessment. It explores the circumstances that may indicate a vertical competition agreement and outlines how such an agreement should be assessed under Article 5 of the Cartel Act, taking into account economic insights. In addition to the potential classification as a hard vertical agreement, the significance of competition impairment based on NPR, and justifications for economic efficiency, the dissertation also delves into issues of evidence and the procedural assessment of the cessation of NPR.